…falsification was introduced not because it better captured the reality of how scientists justified their beliefs, but to sidestep the technical problem of induction that was most famously raised by Hume. Even today, if you look at the language scientists use, even in the most empirical sciences it is seldom of the form “we built this complicated hypothesis and failed to refute it” (unless it was the null hypothesis that was not rejected, in which case the paper is seldom published) but usually more like “we showed support for this complicated hypothesis that we built”. For Popper, corroborating a theory should carry no weight, so most publications would be deemed irrational. In fact, the only time scientists typically invoke falsifiability is when they need to make a powerplay, to degrade something they don’t like as ‘unscientific’ and thus not worthy of discussion. This is in direct opposition to Popper’s second motivation.